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Abstract 
An expert must train a novice. The novice initially has no cash, so he can only pay the expert 
with the accumulated surplus from his production. At any time, the novice can leave the 
relationship with his acquired knowledge and produce on his own. The sole reason he does 
not is the prospect of learning in future periods. The profit-maximizing relationship is 
structured as an apprenticeship, in which all production generated during training is used to 
compensate the expert. Knowledge transfer takes a simple form. In the first period, the expert 
gifts the novice a positive level of knowledge, which is independent of the players’ discount 
rate. After that, the novice’s total value of knowledge grows at the players’ discount rate until 
all knowledge has been transferred. The inefficiencies that arise from this contract are caused 
by the expert’s artificially slowing down the rate of knowledge transfer rather than by her 
reducing the total amount of knowledge eventually transferred. We show that these 
inefficiencies are larger the more patient the players are. Finally, we study the impact of 
knowledge externalities across players. 
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Relational Knowledge Transfers
Luis Garicano Luis Rayo
I  Introduction
Teaching involves a transfer of human capital, and thus, unlike in other market transactions, it does
not create a collaterizable asset. Moreover since the human capital of the student (novice) is low
at the start, he often does not have the means to pay in cash for the knowledge transfer. In this
case, the absence of collateral means the rate of knowledge transfer is constrained not just by the
learning technology, but also by the need to ensure the apprentice has the means to pay. Unlike in
the rst-best allocation, where knowledge is transferred as fast as technologically feasible, without
contractual enforcement the rate of knowledge transfer is the result of a trade-o¤: the faster it is,
the sooner valuable output can be generated; but if it is too fast, the novice will leave without
compensating the teacher. For example, in a consulting rm, novices, usually called associates,
do not leave as long as they are learning enough and have a valuable enough promise at the end,
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the partnership. Or, in a international joint venture in a developing country, the local partner
could potentially ignore the agreements in the IJV and establish his own operations, but will not
do so as long as the future value of the remaining technology transfer is high enough to justify the
continuation of the relationship. In these cases, the rate of knowledge transfer by the expert is
constrained by the need to ensure a high enough continuation value.
The object of this paper is to study, in the absence of formal contracting, the form and duration
of the relationship between expert and novice, as well as the determinants of the rate of knowledge
transfer and its implications for e¢ ciency.
To do this, we set up a simple model of the relationship between an expert and a novice. The
expert has a stock of knowledge which he may use to teach the novice. Players can make spot swaps
of knowledge for cash, but cannot commit to future promises. There are no technological limits to
the rate at which knowledge can be transferred. Thus, in the unconstrained rst-best allocation, all
knowledge transfer occurs in the rst period. Any slower rate of knowledge transfer is attributable
to contractual di¢ culties.
Initially, the novice has no knowledge and no cash. At this stage, standard market contracting is
worthless: the expert cannot transfer his knowledge in exchange for a payment, as knowledge is not
contractible and the novice cannot commit to paying back in the future. Instead, the players can
engage in a relational contract, where the relationship itself sustains knowledge transfers by providing
an expectation of future payments. Such payments are sustained in turn by the expectation of further
knowledge transfers from the expert.
A relational contract may in principle take many forms. In one extreme, which we call an
apprenticeship, the novice captures no rents for the duration of his training. In the other extreme,
all value created throughout the training is captured by the novice. We refer to intermediate cases,
in which rents are shared between novice and expert, as implicit partnerships.
To build intuition, we rst solve a model in which knowledge transfers may occur in at most two
periods. In the prot maximizing contract, there are two spot transfers of knowledge, one in each
period. In the rst period the spot transfer is for free, as the novice has no cash; the expert expects
to get paid in the second period. At the start of the second period there are two relevant contracting
constraints. The swap of knowledge for cash must be incentive compatible, that is the novice must
prefer to pay, and stay in the relationship in order to receive the second part of the knowledge
transfer, rather than quit with the knowledge he already received in the rst period and produce
on his own. Second, the contract must call for a cash transfer that is feasible given the money the
novice has earned after the rst period, using the knowledge acquired during that period. Moreover,
the contract is structured as an apprenticeship, where the novice keeps no rents until knowledge is
fully transferred.
This two-period model raises two questions. First, if the expert is not restricted to two transfer
periods, is an apprenticeship still the optimal contractual form? Second, if so, what is the optimal
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duration of an apprenticeship?
We show that an apprenticeship is indeed the optimal contractual form. Intuition is as follows.
Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that there is no discounting. Consider an implicit partnership
instead of an apprenticeship, in which the novice accumulates some cash balances on the path
of play. The expert can do better using the following alternative contract, which delivers the
same payo¤ to the novice and leaves all his incentive constraints una¤ected. Reduce the novices
current cash balance by one dollar and fully compensate the novice as follows. First, increase his
current knowledge by a small amount, while keeping all future levels of knowledge constant (in other
words, accelerate knowledge transfer), and let him keep the immediate incremental output generated.
Second, one period in the future transfer back to the novice one dollar minus the incremental output
already received by the novice. By accelerating knowledge transfer, additional surplus is created.
As a result, the net e¤ect for the expert is a higher cash ow at no additional cost.
Next, we examine the optimal rate of knowledge transfer. Firstly, we show that there is an interior
solution. The duration of training cannot be innite, since the apprentice is giving up increasingly
large amounts of output per period to get additional knowledge, and thus in exchange he must be
receiving, to maintain incentive compatibility, increasing knowledge transfers over time. Since total
knowledge is nite, a full transfer of knowledge must occur in nite time. On the other hand, since
the novice initially has no cash, training must last longer than a single period.
Secondly, the rate of knowledge transfer decreases (and the contract duration increases) in the
discount factor (namely, the playersdegree of patience). The loss of a longer contract duration for
the expert is that less knowledge, and therefore less cash, is transferred between players each period;
the gain is that there is one additional period in which the expert receives a money transfer from the
apprentice. When players are more patient the loss shrinks, as the apprentice places a higher value
on the promised future payo¤ and therefore knowledge can be transferred more quickly. Moreover,
the gain grows as the expert places a higher value on the transfer taking place in the additional
period.
The above result implies that the optimal contract becomes less e¢ cient as players become more
patient. The opposite is true in the social planners constrained-e¢ cient contract. The di¤erence
between the planners problem and the expert one is that the planner only needs to extract enough
output to ensure that the participation constraint of the expert is met. Since knowledge can be
transferred more quickly when the novice is more patient (more cash can be credibly extracted),
enough output to compensate the expert can be extracted more quickly.
We also extend the model to introduce knowledge externalities across players. An example of
positive externalities is the case of team production, where the knowledge of the novice aids the
experts own production  for example, the novice asks fewer questions as his knowledge grows,
leaving more time for the expert to help other novices (see Garicano, 2000, for a model where
managers help workers along these lines). An example of negative externalities is the case of market
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rivalry, where the expert and novice compete for a xed set of customers. We show that the smaller
the externality the slower the rate of knowledge transfer.
The human capital acquisition literature, since Beckers (1994(1963)) classic analysis, shows rms
will not pay for general human capital acquisition  if they were to do so they could not recoup
the investment, as workers could work for another rm for a better wage. But e¢ ciency will follow
since workers have the right incentives to pay for their own human capital acquisition, for example
by working for a lower wage. A large literature has tried to explain under these circumstances rms
incentives to train in general skills by relying on market imperfections which allow rms to recoup
the investment in training. This imperfections may be: imperfect competition for workers (e.g.
Stevens, 1994, Acemoglu, 1997, and Acemoglu and Piscke, 1999); asymmetric information about
training (e.g. Katz and Zimmerman, 1990, Chang and Wang, 1995, and Acemoglu and Pishke,
1998); or matching frictions (Burdett and Smith, 1996, and Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998). By
contrast, in our analysis there is no asymmetric information or lack of competition that allows
the rm to extract returns from general training. It is simply the timing of training, with bigger
promises of training coming along, that allows general training to be provided.1
A di¤erent literature studies the complementary problem of rmscredible promises to reward
workersinvestments in specic human capital. Prendergast (1993) suggests promotions may be a
solution if promotion leads to an e¢ cient assignment of jobs to workers only if the workers actually
did train. Similarly, as Kahn and Huberman (1988) and Waldman (1990) show, an up-or-out rule
can also lead to credible promises, even if the promoted worker has similar productivity in all
jobs. Instead, in our paper careers endogenously involve increasingly large and increasingly valuable
knowledge transfers promised for the next period to ensure the worker does not quit.
Malcomson et al. (2003) is closer to our work, as it has general training being the result of a
relational contract. However, they assume the timing of training is exogenously determined to take
place at the start of the training contract, whereas the key issue in our analysis is to determine the
amount of training per period and the overall duration of training. In Malcomson et al., the reason
workers do not quit is because of adverse selection only the workers current employer can see the
level of training received by the worker. Finally, they assume rms can commit to a wage level post
training, whereas in our model there is no commitment on either side.
In addition, our work is related to the literature on principal-agent models with relational con-
tracts, in which, akin to our model, self-enforcing rewards motivate the agent (e.g. Bull, 1987,
Spear and Srivastava, 1987, MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989, 1998, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy,
1994, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1998, and Levin, 2003). This literature focuses on eliciting a costly,
productive e¤ort from the agent while treating the agents skill level as stationary and exogenous. In
1Alternatively, in the learning by doing models (following e.g. Heckman (1971),Weiss (1972),Rosen (1972),
Killingsworth (1982), Shaw (1989) skill accumulation is a byproduct of work. Unlike in the learning by doing models,
in our work the principal can control the rate of learning being involved in production does not automatically
determine the learning rate.
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contrast, we treat the agents skill as persistent and endogenous while assuming away e¤ort costs.2
A related literature in nance studies dynamic contracting in environments in which the principal
funds a project and the agent can privately divert cash ows at the expense of investors. Incentives
are sustained through threats of contract termination, such as withholding future funding and seizing
assets (e.g. DeMarzo and Sannikov, 2006, Biais et al., 2007, DeMarzo and Fishman, 2007). In these
models the agent cannot expropriate a productive asset (or, say, contribute diverted cash ows to
nance a new project), whereas in our model the agent can leave the relationship at any time with
her accumulated knowledge and enjoy its full net present value.
Also related is Hörner and Skrzypacz (2010), which shows that in an environment without prop-
erty rights a seller of information benets from gradual revelation. In this paper, gradual revelation
arises from the value of information being privately known by the seller. In our model, in contrast,
the value of information is known to all and gradual transmission arises instead from the buyer
being liquidity-constrained.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II sets up the baseline model.
Sections III and IV present our core analysis and ndings. Section V discusses constrained-optimal
contracts. Section VI studies four extensions of the baseline model. First, it considers the case in
which the novice is endowed, up front, with a positive level of cash. Second, it considers the case
of externalities between the expert and the novice substitutabilities (like in competitive settings)
and complementarities (like in team or hierarchy settings). Third, it considers the case in which
knowledge has a degree of relationship specicity. Fourth, it considers competition in a model with
multiple experts and novices in which experts are restricted to training at most one novice each.
Section VII applies our model to three problems: training in professional service rms, the regulation
of apprenticeships, and knowledge transfers in joint ventures. Finally, section VIII concludes.
II Baseline Model
There are two risk-neutral players: an expert (E) and a novice (N). Players interact over innite
periods t = 1; 2; ::: and discount future payo¤s using a common discount factor  2 (0; 1). The
expert initially possesses one unit of general-purpose knowledge. This knowledge is divisible and
can be transferred from the expert to the novice at any speed desired by the expert. Let xt denote
the fraction of knowledge transferred during period t and let Xt denote the novices total knowledge,
inclusive of xt, in period t:
Xt = xt +Xt 1;
with X0 = 0.
2A related literature in nance studies dynamic contracting in environments in which the agent can privately
diverting cash ows at the expense of investors. Incentives are sustained through threats of contract termination, such
as withholding futiure fundind and seizing assets (e.g. ). In contrast,
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The novice produces output f(Xt) during period t; with f increasing and f(0) = 0:3 This output
belongs to the novice. After production, the novice splits his output between consumption ct  0
and savings. The novice has a bank account that pays gross interest 1+ r = 1 between periods. Let
Bt denote the balance of this bank account at the end of period t: The novice has no initial capital
(B0 = 0) and no borrowing ability (Bt  0). In section VI we extend our model to the case in which
B0 > 0:
Each period has two stages:4
1. Transaction stage. Players make simultaneous proposals regarding a knowledge transfer xt and
a money transfer mt from the novice to the expert. Formally, a proposal for player i = E;N
is a pair (xit;m
i
t): A proposal is feasible if x
i
t  1  Xt 1 (namely, the expert has a su¢ cient
stock of remaining knowledge) and mit  1Bt 1 (namely, the novice has su¢ cient capital). If
(xEt ;m
E
t ) = (x
N
t ;m
N
t ) an agreement is reached and the corresponding knowledge and money
transfers take place. Otherwise, no agreement is reached and xt = mt = 0:
2. Production/consumption stage. Output f(Xt) is realized and the novice selects ct: A consump-
tion level is feasible if 0  ct  f(Xt)+ 1Bt 1 mt. The novices savings at the end of period
t satisfy
Bt = f(Xt)  ct + 1

Bt 1  mt:
All choices and output levels are publicly observable, but non-veriable. The only formal contracts
that can be written between players are the spot contracts described in the transaction stage.
For the time being, we assume that the expert faces zero costs when transferring knowledge to the
novice. This assumption rules out, in particular, transaction costs associated to knowledge transfers
as well as externalities (pecuniary or otherwise) experienced by the expert as the novice acquires
knowledge. In section VI we extend the model to allow for a class of externalities.
From the standpoint of the start of period t; the payo¤s for expert and novice are, respectively,
t =
1X
=t
 tm ; and
Vt =
1X
=t
 tc =
1

Bt 1 +
1X
=t
 t [f(X ) m ] :
A relational contract (or more briey, a contract) prescribes, on the path of play, a triple
hXt;mt; cti for every period t and, upon any deviation from that path, a suspension of all further
transactions between the players. For notational simplicity we denote a contract by its prescribed
actions on the path of play: C = hXt;mt; cti1t=1. We say that a contract is feasible if it meets the
3See footnote 6 for the case in which f(0) > 0:
4The order in which these two stages take place is immaterial. The critical assumption is that spot trades of money
and knowledge are feasible.
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basic requirements described above and, in addition, it constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the dynamic game.
Given a feasible contract C, denote the associated equilibrium values of t; Vt; and Bt; respectively,
t(C); Vt(C); and Bt(C): Feasibility of C requires that the following three constraints are met. First,
the expert obtains a non-negative payo¤ from every t period onwards:
t(C)  0 for all t: (t)
Second, the novice has su¢ cient liquidity to make each transfer mt:
mt  1

Bt 1(C) for all t: (Lt)
Third, before the transaction stage of every period, the novice prefers to carry on with the prescribed
actions over walking away with his current stock of knowledge and his current bank account:5
1
1   f(Xt 1) +
1

Bt 1(C)  Vt(C) for all t: (ICt)
Denition 1
a. Period t is a training period of contract C if Xt 1 < Xsup(C); where Xsup(C) = limk!1Xk:
b. The training phase of C consists of all training periods of C:
Denition 2 Contract C is an apprenticeship if mt = 1Bt 1(C) during every training period in
C.
In what follows we assume that the discount factor is genericin the following sense: there is no
n 2 f1; 2; ::::g such that  = n 1n : This assumption simplies the analysis by ruling out (knife-edge)
cases in which there are multiple optimal contracts for the expert.
III Preliminaries: short-duration contracts
To build intuition, we begin by restricting attention to simple contracts in which (1) the expert
transfers all knowledge to the novice either during the rst period or during the rst two periods
and (2) all money transfers are nonnegative (money ows only from the novice to the expert).
A. One training period
5A simple observation is in order. Given the general-purpose nature of knowledge, it is immaterial for the model
whether the residual claimant of output is the novice (as we have assumed) or the expert. In the former case, the
novices key deviation consists in walking away from the relationship during the transaction phase of a given period
t before making any money transfer to the expert. In the latter case, the novices key deviation is identical except
for the fact that it is initiated during the production/consumption phase of period t   1; with the novice producing
output f(Xt 1) on his own rather than for the expert. In present value, both deviations lead to the same payo¤.
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Consider a contract in which all knowledge is transferred during the transaction stage of period
1, namely, X1 = 1. In this case, the novice produces f(1) during the production/consumption stage
of period 1 and also produces f(1) during the production/consumption stage of each period after
that. Since the novice enters period 1 with zero capital, the expert receives a zero money transfer
in period 1. In each subsequent period, the novice has no reason to transfer money to the expert
(as he has no further knowledge to gain in return) and so the expert receives a zero money transfer
as well. As a result, the overall payo¤ for the expert is zero and the overall payo¤ for the novice is
the full present value of output 11 f(1): This contract is ideal for the novice and also maximizes
total surplus, but is undesirable for the expert.
B. Two training periods
Consider now a contract in which all knowledge is transferred during the rst two periods, namely,
0 < X1 < X2 = 1: In this case, the novice produces f(X1) during period 1 and produces f(1) during
each period after that. The only period in which the expert may hope to receive a positive money
transfer is period 2, in exchange for knowledge transfer 1 X1:
The expert faces two relevant constraints. First, the second-period money transfer cannot exceed
the novices bank balance at the beginning of period 2:
m2  1

[f(X1)  c1] ; (i)
where f(X1)   c1 are the novices savings at the end of period 1: Second, from the standpoint of
the beginning of period 2, the novice must prefer to continue with the relationship (which involves
paying m2 for knowledge 1   X1 and enjoying the present discounted value of output f(1)) over
leaving the relationship (which involves keeping her full bank balance and enjoying the present
discounted value of the lower output f(X1)):
1

[f(X1)  c1] m2 + 1
1   f(1) 
1

[f(X1)  c1] + 1
1   f(X1);
which simplies to
m2  1
1   [f(1)  f(X1)] : (ii)
The prot-maximizing contract solves the simple problem
max
X1;c1
m2
s:t: (i) and (ii).
Notice that, without loss, the expert can set c1 = 0; which maximally relaxes constraint (i) without
a¤ecting any other aspect of the problem.
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Consequently, the experts problem further simplies to
max
X1
m2
s:t: mt  min

1

f(X1);
1
1   [f(1)  f(X1)]

,
where the rst term in the min operator is the R.H.S of (i) (for c1 = 0) and the second term is the
R.H.S of (ii).
Since the rst term in the min operator is increasing in X1 and the second term is decreasing in
X1; the solution involves selecting X1 such that both terms are equal. Letting X1 denote the optimal
value of X1; we obtain f(X1 ) = f(1); which in turn delivers an optimized payo¤ m2 = f(1) for
the expert.
Intuitively, raising X1 increases the novices bank account, from which he can pay the expert for
the remaining knowledge (1 X1); but raising X1 also increases the novices incentive to walk away
before the contract has been completed. The optimal X1 is just high enough so that the novice
is willing to pay the entire rst-period output f(X1 ) (plus interest) to the expert in period 2 in
exchange for all remaining knowledge.
The above discussion provides several clues that are valuable when solving for the unrestricted
optimal contract. First, training takes at least two periods to complete. Second, until training is
complete, the novice enjoys zero consumption and uses all her output to pay the expert for additional
knowledge. Third, until training is complete, the novices liquidity and incentive constraints both
bind.
IV Optimal contract
This section solves for the experts optimal contract. First, we present three preliminary lemmas
describing necessary features of any optimal contract. Second, we present a characterization theorem
showing that any optimal contract involves full knowledge transfer in nite time and takes the form
of an apprenticeship with zero consumption during the training phase. Third, we show that there
is a unique optimal contract and we present this contract in closed form. Finally, we discuss the
e¢ ciency properties of the optimal contract and the role of .
We work with a relaxed problem for the expert in which her own continuation-payo¤ constraints
t are ignored. As shown in corollary 1 below, ignoring such constraint is without loss. The relaxed
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problem is
max
C
X1
t=2
t 1mt (I)
s:t
mt  1

Bt 1(C) for all t; (Lt)
1
1   f(Xt 1) +
1

Bt 1(C)  Vt(C) for all t: (ICt)
We say that contract C = (Xt ;mt ; ct ) is optimal if it solves the above problem.
Lemma 1 Let C be an optimal contract. During every period before the end of the training phase
(i.e. every period such that Xt < Xsup(C)) the novice transfers the full balance of his bank account
to the expert (i.e. mt =
1
Bt 1(C)).
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that there is a t such that Xt < Xsup(C) and yet mt <
1
Bt 1(C). There are two possibilities: Xt < Xt+1 and Xt = Xt+1: The argument that follows
considers only the former case (Xt < Xt+1). Appendix A considers the general case (Xt  Xt+1).
Without loss, set ck = 0; and therefore Vk(C) = t+1 kVt+1(C); for all k  t+ 1: Now consider
an alternative contract C0 =
D
X
0
t ;m
0
t; c
0
t
E1
t=1
that is identical to C except for the following: for some
small " > 0, (i) m0t = mt + ", (ii) m0t+1 = mt+1   1 "+ 1  ", and (iii) f(X 0t) = f(Xt ) + (1  )":
Notice that
Vt+1(C0) = 1


1

Bt 1(C0) m0t + f(X
0
t)

| {z }
Bt(C0)
+
h
f(X
0
t+1) m0t+1
i
+
X
t+2
 (t+1)

f(X 0 ) m0

=
1


1

Bt 1(C) mt + f(Xt )

| {z }
Bt(C)
+
h
f(X
0
t+1) mt+1
i
+
X
t+2
 (t+1)

f(X 0 ) m0

= Vt+1(C):
C0 satises all constraints in the relaxed problem:
1. Lt holds since " is small.
2. ICt holds as all terms are unchanged.
3. Lt+1 holds as both the L.H.S. and R.H.S. of this constraint increase by  1 "+ 1  ".
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4. ICt+1 holds since
1
1   f(X
0
t) +
1


1

Bt 1(C0) m0t + f(X 0t)

| {z }
Bt(C0)
=
1
1   f(X

t ) +
1


1

Bt 1(C) mt + f(Xt )

| {z }
Bt(C)
 Vt+1(C) = Vt+1(C0):
5. All other liquidity and incentive constraints hold as their terms are una¤ected.
Finally, note that C0 increases the experts payo¤ by
t 1
 
m0t  mt

+ t
 
m0t+1  mt+1

= t 1(1  )" > 0;
a contradiction.
Intuition for lemma 1 is as follows. Suppose there is a period t in which (1) the novice has not
yet received the totality of knowledge that the contract will eventually grant him (Xt < Xsup(C))
and (2) the novice does not transfer the full balance of his bank account to the expert. Then, the
expert can increase her payo¤ by modifying the contract as follows. Request, during the transaction
stage of period t; a slightly higher transfer from the novice. In return, and in a manner that leaves
the novice exactly indi¤erent, grant the novice a slightly higher knowledge transfer during period t
and request a slightly lower transfer during period t + 1: By virtue of accelerating the knowledge
transfer, this modication leads to higher surplus which the expert keeps for herself owing to the
fact that the novice is left indi¤erent. Notice, in particular that, in present value, the increase in
the period t transfer is larger in magnitude than the reduction in the period t+ 1 transfer.
Lemma 2 Every optimal contract C has a nite training phase (i.e. there exists a period T such
that XT = Xsup(C)).
Proof. Suppose not. Select an arbitrary period K and, without loss, set ct = 0; and therefore
Vt(C) = K tVK(C), for all t < K: From lemma 1 we have mt = 1Bt 1 = 1f(Xt 1) for all t < K;
and mt =
1
Bt 1 =
1
f(X

t 1)  ct 1 for all t  K. We can write the experts payo¤ asXK
t=2
t 2f(Xt 1) +
X1
t=K+1
t 2

f(Xt 1)  ct 1

;
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where the values of Xt 1 and ct 1 satisfy
1
1   f(X

t 1) +
1

f(Xt 1)  K tVK(C) for all t < K
1
1   f(X

t 1) +
1

Bt 1(C)  Vt(C) for all t  K
Since VK is bounded above by 11 f(Xsup(C)), the experts payo¤ is bounded above byXK
t=2
K 1f(Xsup(C)) +
X1
t=K+1
t 2f(Xsup(C))
= (K   1) K 1f(Xsup(C)) + 
K+1
1   f(Xsup(C
)):
When K is arbitrarily large this payo¤ is arbitrarily close to zero (since limK!1 (K   1) K 1 = 0)
and therefore lower than the payo¤ attained using the contract with two training periods described
in the preceding section. This fact contradicts the hypothesis that setting Xt < Xsup(C) for all t
is optimal.
Intuition for lemma 2 is as follows. Consider a contract with an innitely long training phase.
Select an arbitrarily large period K and notice that the knowledge transferred after that period
(Xsup(C) XK) is worth essentially zero, in present value, to either party (namely, 
K
1 f(Xsup(C))
  K1 f(XK) is arbitrarily close to zero). Alternatively, the expert could transfer that knowledge to
the novice early on, for free, in a way that relaxes the novices liquidity constraints (such knowledge
transfer must be properly timed so as to not violate the novices incentive constraints). Then, by
lemma 1, the expert could use the resulting slack in the liquidity constraints to increase her payo¤
during a period that is less heavily discounted.
Lemma 3 Let C be an optimal contract. During the last period of the training phase (i.e. the
smallest period T such that XT = Xsup(C)) the novice transfers the full balance of his bank account
to the expert (i.e. mT =
1
BT 1(C)).
Proof. See appendix B.
Intuition for lemma 3 is as follows. Consider a contract with T training periods in which the expert
does not extract the full balance of the novices bank during the transaction stage of period T (the
last active transaction stage in the contract). This contract can only be optimal if an increase in the
T period transfer violates the novices T period incentive constraint. It follows that this must be a
contract in which the knowledge transferred during period T (Xsup(C) XT 1) is small relative to
the novices T period cash balances. In other words, it is a contract in which substantial knowledge
was transferred early on and, as a result, the novice enjoys rents in period T above and beyond
the present discounted value of f(Xsup(C)). The expert, however, could replicate such substantial
early knowledge transfer by merely shortening the length of the contracts training phase and, as a
result, eliminating the need for the novice to enjoy those additional rents.
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Theorem 1 Any optimal contract C has the following features:
1. It is an apprenticeship with a nite training phase (i.e. Xt < XT = Xsup(C) implies mt =
1
Bt 1(C) and mt+1 = 1Bt(C)).
2. Consumption is zero during every period before the end of the training phase (i.e. Xt <
Xsup(C) implies ct = 0).
3. During every period of the training phase, the novices incentive constraint holds with equality.
4. All available knowledge is transferred to the novice (i.e. Xsup(C) = 1).
Proof. Part 1 follows from combining lemmas 1-3.
For part 2, suppose toward a contradiction that there is a period t such that Xt < Xsup(C) and
yet ct > 0: Now consider an alternative contract C0 that is identical to C except for the following:
(i) c0t = 0; (ii) c0t+1 = ct+1 +
1
 c

t . As a result, Bt(C0) = Bt(C) + ct ; Vt+1(C0) = Vt+1(C) + 1 ct ; and
Bk(C0) = Bk(C) and Vk+1(C0) = Vk+1(C) for all k 6= t: It follows that C0 satises all constraints and,
since this new contract delivers the same payo¤ as C to the expert, C0 must be optimal. However,
we have
1

Bt(C0) m0t+1 =
1

Bt(C) + 1

ct  mt+1 >
1

Bt(C) mt+1  0;
and therefore m0t+1 <
1
Bt(C0); which from lemmas 1 and 3 implies that C0 is not optimal, a contra-
diction.
For parts 3 and 4, we can write the experts payo¤ asXT
t=2
t 1mt =
XT
t=2
t 2f(Xt 1);
where T is the smallest period such that XT = Xsup(C) and mt = 1Bt 1 = 1f(Xt 1) for all
t 2 f2; :::; Tg owing to lemmas 1 and 3 and part 2 of the theorem. Moreover, C must satisfy the
following incentive constraints for the novice:6
f(Xt 1)  T (t 1)f(Xsup(C)) for all t  T:
We rst claim that all such constraints must hold with equality. Notice that the R.H.S. of these
constraints is increasing in t: Now suppose, contrary to this claim, that at least one such constraint
holds with strict inequality. Select the largest t0  T such that the corresponding constraint holds
6To see why we can write the incentive constraint in this way recall that the original incentive constraint is
1
1   f(X

t 1) +
1

Bt 1(C)  Vt(C):
Moreover, from parts 1 and 2 of the theorem, 1

Bt 1(C) = 1 f(Xt 1) and Vt(C) = 
T t
1  f(Xsup(C)): The desired
inequality follows from substituting these expressions in the original incentive constraint and rearranging terms.
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with strict inequality, and so f(Xt0 1) < f(X

t0). Notice that the expert could have attained a higher
payo¤ by increasing Xt0 by a small amount while holding every other X

t constant, a contradiction.
This observation establishes part 3.
We may now further simplify the experts payo¤ toXT
t=2
T 1f(Xsup(C)):
If Xsup(C) was smaller that 1; the expert could have attained a higher payo¤ by increasing Xsup(C).
This observation establishes part 4.
Intuition for theorem 1 is as follows. Part 1 merely combines lemmas 1-3. Part 2 is derived from
the following observation. Suppose there is a period t in which (1) the novice has not yet received
the totality of knowledge that the contract will eventually grant him (Xt < Xsup(C)) and (2) the
novice enjoys $1 of consumption. Then, the expert could alter the contract, without a¤ecting either
partys payo¤, by merely requesting that the novice saves, rather than consumes, an additional $1
during period t and then consumes an additional $1 during period t + 1. Since this modication
relaxes the novices period t + 1 liquidity constraint, by lemmas 1 and 3, the expert could use the
resulting slack to increase her payo¤.
Part 3 is derived from the following observation. If the incentive constraint for period t is slack,
the expert can increase her payo¤ by increasing Xt 1 for free (which increases the novices bank
balance for period t) and then requesting a higher payo¤ from the novice in period t; at which point
both the incentive and liquidity constraints are slack.
For part 4, consider an optimal contract C with T training periods. Since this contract prescribes
zero consumption and zero cash accumulation during those T periods, the novices equilibrium
payo¤ from the standpoint of period T is VT (C) = 11 f(Xsup(C)) = 11 f(XT ) and therefore his
equilibrium payo¤ from the standpoint of period t  T is
Vt(C) = 
T t
1   f(X

T ):
Note that if XT was smaller than 1 the expert could have relaxed all incentive constraints, with-
out a¤ecting the liquidity constraints and without a¤ecting the payo¤ of either party, by merely
increasing XT : As noted above, however, the expert could use this slack to increase her payo¤.
Corollary 1 shows that there is a unique optimal contract and describes such contract in closed
form:
Corollary 1 Let C be an optimal contract. The duration of its training phase, denoted T (C);
solves
max
T
(T   1)T 1f(1):
As a result, there is a unique optimal contract with the following features (up to an integer constraint
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for T (C)):
1. T (C) = 1 + jln j 1
2. f (Xt) = 1e
 (t 1)f(1) for all t 2 f1; :::; T (C)g:
3. mt = T tf(1) for all t 2 f2; :::; T (C)g and mt = 0 for every t =2 f2; :::; T (C)g:
Proof. For the rst part of the corollary, let C be an optimal contract with T (C) training periods.
From theorem 1, part 4, we have Xsup(C) = 1 and from theorem 1, parts 1-3, the liquidity and
incentive constraints deliver, for all t 2 f2; :::; T (C)g;
mt =
1

Bt 1 (C) = 1

f
 
Xt 1

; and (Lt)
1
1   f(X

t 1) +
1

f
 
Xt 1

= Vt(C) = 
T (C) t
1   f(1): (ICt)
By combining the above expressions we obtain, for all t 2 f2; :::; T (C)g;
mt = 
T (C) tf(1):
The experts payo¤ is therefore
T (C)X
t=2
t 1mt = (T (C)  1) T (C
) 1f(1):
Notice that for C to be optimal, T (C) must maximize the above expression.
For point 1 of the corollary, note that (T   1)T 1f(1) is a concave function of T that is uniquely
maximized (up to an integer constraint for T ) at T = 1+ (  ln ) 1 : The remaining points 2 and 3
of the corollary follow from setting T (C) = 1 + (  ln ) 1 in constraints (Lt) and (ICt) above and
noting that  
1
ln  = 1e .
Corollary 1 shows that, in the optimal contract, knowledge transfer takes a simple form. In period
1, the novice receives knowledge X1 such that f(X1 ) = e 1f(1); regardless of : After that, the
novices total value of knowledge grows at rate r = 1   1 until the training phase is complete.7
E¢ ciency and the role of 
7Remark 1 extends the above results to the case in which f(0) > 0:
Remark 1 If f(0)  e 1f(1) all results are una¤ected. If f(0) > e 1f(1); then the optimal contract Csatises all
properties in theorem 1. Moreover,
X1 = 0 and
f(Xt+1) = (1 + r)f(X

t ) for all t < T (C):
Proof. Available upon request.
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The experts optimal contract C is socially ine¢ cient as it articially spreads the transfer of
knowledge over multiple periods rather than transferring all knowledge up front. From corollary 1,
the total waste in surplus, discounted to period 1, is
jln j 1X
t=1

t 1   1
e

f(1):
This waste increases in  for two reasons. First, a higher  implies a longer training phase and, with
it, a lower rate of knowledge transfer. Second, a higher  implies that the ine¢ ciencies caused by
this lower rate loom larger from the perspective of period 1.
To provide intuition for why the optimal training phase increases with  we compare a contract
with two training periods against a contract with three training periods, both satisfying the prop-
erties in theorem 1 (i.e. apprenticeships with zero consumption during their respective training
phases, binding incentive constraints, and full knowledge transfer).
In the contract with two training periods, the expert transfers knowledge such that f(X1) = f(1)
and f(X2) = f(1). In return, the expert receives money transfer m2 = f(1) in period 2 and her
total payo¤, discounted to period 1, is
1 = f(1):
In the contract with three training periods, the expert transfers knowledge such that f(X1) =
2f(1), f(X2) = f(1); and f(X3) = f(1): In return, the expert receives money transfersm2 = f(1)
and m3 = f(1) and her total payo¤, discounted to period 1, is
1 = 2
2f(1):
(In other words, the trade-o¤ facing the expert is that reducing the speed at which knowledge is
transferred leads to lower transfers during the training phase, but also leads to a larger number of
such transfer.)
As  grows, the novice places a higher value on receiving incremental knowledge even if he receives
this knowledge slightly farther in the future. Consequently, slowing down the speed of knowledge
transfer has less of a negative impact on each money transfer the expert is capable of extracting
during the training phase. It follows that using a longer training phase becomes relatively more
attractive.
V Constrained-e¢ cient contracts
In this section, we study surplus-maximizing contracts. So that the exercise is nontrivial, in addition
to imposing the novices liquidity and incentive constraints, we impose a new constraint requiring
that the expert receives a payo¤ no lower than an exogenous value 0 > 0 in exchange for training
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the novice:
1(C)  0:
We may interpret 0, for example, as a xed cost incurred by the expert. We assume that 0 is
low enough so that full knowledge transfer is in fact feasible.8
A constrained-e¢ cient contract solves
max
C
X
t
t 1f(Xt)
s:t:
Lt, ICt for all t; and
1(C)  0:
Proposition 1 shows that any constrained-e¢ cient contract has several properties that mirror the
experts prot-maximizing contract:
Proposition 1 Any constrained-e¢ cient contract C has the following features:
1. It is an apprenticeship with a nite training phase.
2. Consumption is zero during every period before the end of the training phase.
3. During every period of the training phase, the novices incentive constraint holds with equality.
4. All available knowledge is transferred to the novice.
Proof. Available upon request.
The key di¤erence relative to the experts prot-maximizing contract is its duration:
Corollary 2 Let C be a constrained-e¢ cient contract. The duration of its training phase, denoted
T (C); solves
min
T
(T   1)T 1f(1)
s:t:
(T   1)T 1f(1)  0:
8Specically, we assume that
0  max
T
(T   1)T 1f(1) = 1
e jln jf(1);
and so the experts optimal contract delivers a payo¤ of at least 0:
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Proof. Let C be an optimal contract with T (C) training periods. From proposition 1, part 4, we
have Xsup(C) = 1 and from proposition 1, parts 1-3, the liquidity and incentive constraints deliver
mt = 
T (C) tf(1) for all t 2 f2; :::; T (C)g; and
f (Xt) = 
T (C) tf(1) for all t 2 f1; :::; T (C)g:
The experts payo¤ and total surplus, discounted to period 1, are respectively
1 = (T (C)  1) T (C) 1f(1); and
1X
t=1
t 1f(Xt) = (T (C)  1) T (C) 1f(1) + 1
1   f(1)
The corollary follows from the observation that surplus decreases in T (C) and the requirement that
1  0:
Corollaries 1 and 2 imply that the training phase of the experts prot-maximizing contract is
at least as long as the training phase of the constrained-e¢ cient contract. Moreover, as  grows,
while the training phase of the experts prot-maximizing contract grows, the training phase of the
constrained-e¢ cient contract shrinks.
VI Extensions
In this section we study three extensions of our baseline model (with each extension considered in
isolation from the other two). First, we consider the case in which the novice is endowed, up front,
with a positive level of cash. Second, we consider the case in which the expert directly benets or
su¤ers from the knowledge acquired by the novice, i.e. knowledge transfers produce an externality on
the expert. Third, we consider the case in which knowledge has a degree of relationship specicity.
A common theme throughout these extensions is that, under the parametrizations we consider,
prot-maximizing contracts give rise to apprenticeships of a nite duration with full knowledge
transfer. As in the baseline model, during the training phase of these contracts the value of the
novices knowledge grows at the gross interest rate (1 + r) = 1 ; regardless of other parameter
values. The novices initial cash balance, the size of the externalities, and the degree of knowledge
specicity a¤ect, exclusively, the magnitude of the initial knowledge transfer X1: Moreover, in all
three extensions, as players become more patient ( grows) the prot-maximizing contract involves
a (weakly) longer training phase and a (weakly) lower level of e¢ ciency.
A Novices liquidity
Proposition 1 extends our baseline results to the case in which the novice enters period 1 with a
positive bank balance, namely, 1B0 > 0:
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Proposition 2 Suppose 1B0 > 0:
1. Case 1: 1B0  e
 1
1 f(1): The optimal contract C satises all properties in theorem 1. More-
over,
f(X1 ) = e
 1f(1); and
f(Xt+1) = (1 + r)f(X

t ) for all t < T (C):
In this case, Ns initial balance does not accelerate the rate of knowledge transfer and N
receives rents
e 1
1   f(1) 
1

B0:
2. Case 2: 1B0 2

e 1
1 f(1);
1
1 f(1)

: The optimal contract C satises all properties in theorem
1. Moreover,
f(X1 ) =
1  

B0 > e
 1f(1) and
f(Xt+1) = (1 + r)f(X

t ) for all t < T (C):
In this case, Ns initial balance accelerates the speed of knowledge transfer exclusively through
its positive impact on X1 and N receives zero rents.
3. Case 3: 1B0  11 f(1): The optimal contract C prescribes full knowledge transfer in period
1 in exchange for money transfer 11 f(1): N receives zero rents.
Proof. Available upon request.
Intuition is as follows. In case 1, the expert is able to use an ideal arrangement. Namely, she
implements the optimal contract from the baseline model and, simultaneously, she extracts the
novices entire balance 1B0: This arrangement is possible because the optimal contract from the
baseline model had left rents e
 1
1 f(1) in the hands of the novice.
In case 2, the optimal contract is determined by two forces. On the one hand, owing to the forces
behind lemma 1, the expert wishes to extract the novices entire balance in period 1B0; which the
novice will only agree to if he receives su¢ cient knowledge in return. On the other hand, the expert
wishes to keep f(X1) as close as possible to e 1f(1) in order to slow down the overall speed at which
knowledge is transferred. The solution is setting f(X1) to its minimum level such that the novice
surrenders 1B0:
In case 3, the expert is able to implement the rst-best allocation (X1 = 1) while keeping all
surplus ( e
 1
1 f(1)) for herself.
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B Externalities
This section considers an extension of the baseline model in which the expert experiences an
externality as the novice acquires knowledge. In particular, we assume that during the produc-
tion/consumption phase of every period t, the expert produces output f(Xt) for herself, in addition
to the novice producing output f(Xt) for himself. We assume that f is a strictly monotonic function.
Let S(Xt) = f(Xt) + f(Xt) denote the total output produced in period t.
Denition 3 The novices level of knowledge Xt causes a positive (resp. negative) externality on
the expert if f(Xt) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in Xt:
For a simple example of a positive externality consider a senior partner in a law rm (the expert)
who benets when a junior partner (the novice) acquires knowledge and, as a result, enhances
the reputation of the rm in question. For a simple example of a negative externality consider a
technology rm (the expert) that loses prots when a competing rm (the novice) acquires knowledge
and, as a result, becomes a stronger competitor. Note that when f(Xt) is independent of Xt the
extended model is equivalent to the baseline model.
Assumption 1 S(Xt) is increasing in Xt:
The experts relaxed problem is
max
C
X1
t=1
t 1

mt + f(Xt)

(II)
s:t
(Lt) and (ICt) for all t:
Proposition 2 presents a partial characterization of optimal contracts under externalities:
Proposition 3 Consider the model with externalities. Under assumption 1, any optimal contract
C has the following features:
1. During every period before the end of the training phase the novice transfers the full balance
of his bank account to the expert.
2. The training phase is nite.
3. During every period of the training phase, the novices incentive constraint holds with equality.
Proof. For part 1, we note that the proof of lemma 1 remains valid in the model with externalities,
except for the following di¤erence. Switching from contract C to contract C0 increases the experts
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payo¤ by
t 1
 
m0t  mt + f(X 0t)  f(Xt )

+ t
 
m0t+1  mt+1

=
t 1(1  )"+ t 1  f(X 0t)  f(Xt ) =
t 1
 
f(X 0t)  f(Xt ) + f(X 0t)  f(Xt )

> 0;
where the inequality follows from the fact that S(Xt) is increasing in Xt.9
For part 2, we note that the argument in the proof of lemma 2 remains valid, except for the
following di¤erence. The experts payo¤ isX1
t=1
t 1f(Xt ) +
XK
t=2
t 2f(Xt 1) +
X1
t=K+1
t 2

f(Xt 1)  ct 1

;
which is bounded above by
XK
t=1
t 1f(Xt ) + (K   1) K 1f(Xsup(C)) +
K+1
1   f(Xsup(C
)):
Since the second and third terms converge to zero as K grows to innity, and f is strictly monotonic,
C can be improved upon using an alternative contract C0 with zero money transfers and either
X
0
t = 0 for all t (if f is decreasing) or X
0
t = 1 for all t (if f is increasing).
For part 3, we can write the experts payo¤ as
XT 1
t=2
t 2S(Xt 1) + 
T 1

1

S(XT 1) +
1
1  S(Xsup(C
))  VT (C)

:
where T is the duration of the training phase and the values of Xt and ct satisfy the novices
incentive constraints
1
1   f(X

t 1) +
1

f(Xt 1) =
1
(1  )f(X

t 1)  T tVT (C) for all t  T:
Now suppose, contrary to this claim, that at least one such constraint holds with strict inequality.
Select the largest t0 < T such that the corresponding constraint holds with strict inequality, and so
f(Xt0) < f(X

t0+1). Notice that, under assumption 1, the expert could have attained a higher payo¤
by increasing Xt0 by a small amount while holding every other X

t constant, a contradiction.
Corollary 3 presents a more detailed characterization of the optimal contract under the added
assumption that f and f are linearly related:
Corollary 3 Suppose f(X)  f(X) for some constant :10 Under assumption 1, an optimal
9The argument in appendix A also remains valid because remark 1 is una¤ected.
10Adding a constant to f would be immaterial.
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contract C delivers payo¤
f(Xsup(C)) A(; );
where
A(; ) = max
T
T 1

(T   1)(1 + ) + 
1  

> 0:
As a result, C has the following features:
1. The cumulative knowledge transfer is complete (i.e. Xsup(C) = 1).
2. The initial knowledge transfer X1 is such that
f(X1 ) =
1
e
  

(1+)(1 ) ;
which is increasing in ; increasing in  when  > 0; and decreasing in  when  < 0:
3. During the training phase, the novices output f(Xt ) grows at rate r = 1  1 .
Proof. Available upon request.
Corollary 3 shows that, in the optimal contract, knowledge transfer takes a simple form. In period
1, the novice is gifted knowledgeX1 (; ) such that: (i) f(X1 (; 0)) = e 1f(1) for all  (as the special
case in which  = 0 corresponds to our baseline model); (ii) @@X

1 (; ) > 0 for all ;  (namely,
the larger the externality, the larger the initial knowledge transfer); and (iii) @
2
@@X

1 (; ) > 0 for
all ;  (namely,  magnies the e¤ect of  on X1 ). After period 1, the novices value of knowledge
f(Xt ) grows at rate r =
1
   1; regardless of ; until the training phase is complete.
Figure 1 (at the end of this document) depicts the duration of the training phase as a function
of (; ): Lighter areas correspond to longer durations. In one extreme, when  is su¢ ciently high
and  is su¢ ciently low, training occurs in a single period. In the other extreme, when either 
approaches  1 or  approaches 1 (or both), duration approaches innity.
C Specic knowledge
So far we have focused on cases in which the expert transfers general-purpose knowledge to the
novice. In this section we consider the case in which knowledge is complementary to an asset, such
as a trademark or a factory, owned by the expert. That is, knowledge is (partially) specic to the
relationship.
Formally, the novices period t output is f(Xt; At); where At 2 f0; 1g in as input controlled by the
expert and f(Xt; 1) > f(Xt; 0): The expert selects At during the production/consumption stage of
period t: For every t; a contract prescribes, on the path of play, values hXt;mt; ct; Ati and prescribes,
following any past deviation, an interruption of all transactions and At = 0.
Given contract C = hXt;mt; ct; Ati1t=1, the novices incentive constraints are now as follows. Before
the transaction stage of period t, the novice must prefer to carry on with the prescribed actions over
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walking away with his current stock of knowledge, which is now worth only f(Xt 1; 0) per period,
together with his current bank account:11
1
1   f(Xt 1; 0) +
1

Bt 1(C)  Vt(C): (IC 0t)
The experts problem is
max
C
X1
t=1
t 1mt (II)
s:t
(Lt) and (IC 0t) for all t:
In what follows, we assume that f(Xt; 0)  f(Xt; 1) for some  2 (0; 1): Thus, a smaller 
implies that knowledge is more specic to the novice/expert relationship.
Proposition 4 In the model with specic knowledge, the optimal contract C satises all properties
in theorem 1. In addition, it has the following properties, which extend corollary 1:
1. Up to an integer constraint, the duration of the training phase is
T (C) = jln j 1 + 1  
(1  )(1  );
which is increasing in both  and :
2. During the training phase, the value of knowledge grows at rate r.
3. After training is complete, the novice pays the expert a per-period rental fee
(1  )f(1; 1):
Sketch of proof. Consider a contract C that prescribes, on the path of play, an apprenticeship
with full knowledge transfer and At = 1 for every t.
From the standpoint of period T (C) + 1 (where T (C) is the rst period in which Xt = 1), the
equilibrium continuation payo¤ for the novice is:
V  =
1
1   f(1; 0) +
1

f(1; 1) =


1   +
1


f(1; 1):
11A simple observation is in order. Given the general-purpose nature of knowledge, it is immaterial for the model
whether the residual claimant of output is the novice (as we have assumed) or the expert. In the former case, the
novices key deviation consists in walking away from the relationship during the transaction phase of a given period
t before making any money transfer to the principal. In the latter case, the novices key deviation is identical except
for the fact that it is initiated during the production/consumption phase of period t   1; with the novice producing
output f(Xt 1) on his own rather than for the expert. In present value, both deviations lead to the same payo¤.
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Therefore, the novices incentive constraints during the training phase are

1   +
1


f(Xt 1; 1)  T (t 1)V  for all t 2 f1; :::; T (C)g;
which simplify to
f(Xt 1; 1)  T (t 1)f(1; 1) for all t 2 f1; :::; T (C)g:
By meeting these constraints with equality, the expert obtains the following money transfers
during the training phase
mt =
1

Bt 1 =
1

f(Xt 1; 1) = T tf(1; 1) for all t 2 f2; :::; T (C)g: (a)
After training is complete (t  T (C) + 1), the maximum per period transfer that the expert can
extract from the novice, denoted M; satises
f(1; 1) +

1  f(1; 1) = f(1; 1) +

1   [f(1; 1) M
] ;
and therefore M = (1  )f(1; 1): The expert can then set
mt =M
 = (1  )f(1; 1) for all t  T (C) + 1: (b)
By combining (a) and (b) the experts payo¤ becomes
1 =
X
t2 
t 1mt =
"
T (C
) 1(T (C)  1) + 
T (C)
1   (1  )
#
f(1; 1):
Finally, the rst-order condition for T (C) delivers:
T (C) = 1 + 1jln j  

1   (1  ):
Figure 2 (at the end of this document) depicts the duration of the training phase as a function
of (; ): Lighter areas correspond to longer durations. The training phase expands with  and ,
and, for any given  > 0; the training phase expands to innity as  converges to 1.
D Remarks on competition: a continuum of experts and novices
In this section we investigate a form of competition across experts. We assume that there is a
population with multiple experts and novices, with an equal mass of each. Experts compete for
novices, but are restricted to training at most one novice each.
Formally, consider a continuum of experts, indexed E; and a continuum of novices, indexed N;
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each distributed uniformly on [0; 1]: All experts are identical to the expert in the baseline model.
All novices are identical to the novice in the baseline model except for their initial cash balances.
In particular, we assume that novice N is endowed with balance B(N) at the beginning of period
1, where B(0) = 0 and B0(N)  0 for all N:
Experts and novices are matched in pairs. Each matched pair agrees on a bilateral relational
contract C, as in the baseline model, that governs the corresponding relationship. Let V (N; C) and
(E; C) denote the payo¤s obtained from the viewpoint of period 1 by novice N and expert E;
respectively, upon agreeing to contract C:12 Without loss, we assume that novice N is matched with
expert E = N and we denote their contract C(N) = (Xt(N);mt(N); ct(N))1t=1:
We are interested in describing families of contracts that are immune to pairwise deviations (in
the spirit of Gale and Shapley, 1962):13
Denition 4 A family of contracts C(N)N2[0;1] is stable if (a) each contract is feasible and (b)
there does not exist a pair (N;E) and a feasible contract C0 for that pair such that
V (N; C0) > V (N; C(N)) and (E; C0) > (E; C(E)):
Remark 2 In a stable family of contracts C(N)N2[0;1] all experts obtain identical payo¤s:
(C(E); E) = (C(E0); E0) for all E;E0 2 [0; 1]:
Proof. Suppose contrary to the remark that (C(E); E) > (C(E0); E0) for some E;E0: Then the
pair composed of the novice N = E and expert E0 would strictly prefer matching with each other
and agreeing to a contract C0 that is identical to C(E) except for prescribing an arbitrarily smaller
level of m1:
In general, there are multiple stable families of contracts, di¤ering in both their e¢ ciency levels
and their allocation of surplus.
Denition 5 A stable family of contracts C(N)N2[0;1] is expert-preferred (novice-preferred) if
there is no alternative stable family of contracts C0(N)N2[0;1] yielding higher payo¤s for all experts
(novices).
The simplest example of a stable family of contracts is the unique novice-preferred family. In
this family, all experts transfer 100% of their knowledge in the rst period to their corresponding
novices in exchange for a zero payo¤.
12We dene the novicespayo¤s net of their initial cash balances, and so these payo¤s reect incremental payo¤s
from agreeing to a contract.
13Our focus is on pairwise deviations taking place at the beginning of period 1. We assume that after period 1 no
new matches are formed (e.g. owing to switching costs)..
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The following lemma provides a rst step toward characterizing expert-preferred families of con-
tracts by restricting to the simple class of families with full knowledge transfer in at most two
training periods:
Lemma 4 Suppose experts are restricted to o¤ering contracts with full knowledge transfer in at
most two training periods. Let C(N)N2[0;1] be an expert-preferred, stable family of contracts in that
class. We then have:
1. For all E;
(C(E); E) = f(1):
2. For all N such that B(N)  f(1);
f(X1(N)) = f(1) + rB(N) and V (N; C(N)) = 
1   f(1) + rB(N):
3. For all N such that B(N) > f(1);
f(X1(N)) = f(1) and V (N; C(N)) = 1
1   f(1)  f(1):
Proof. Let C(N)N2[0;1] be an expert-preferred, stable family of contracts in the above class.
Step 1. We argue that, for any given N; f(X1(N)) < f(1) implies that m1(N) = B(N) and
m2(N) =
1
1  [f(1)  f(X1(N))] : That m1(N) = B(N) follows from the proof of lemma 1 and
that m2(N)  11  [f(1)  f(X1(N))] follows from Ns period 2 incentive constraint. Now suppose
toward a contradiction that m2(N) < 11  [f(1)  f(X1(N))]. Expert E = N and novice N could
then simultaneously increase their payo¤s by agreeing on an alternative contract C0 that is identical
to their original contract C(N) except for raising both f(X1(N)) and m2(N) by a small " > 0:
Step 2. We argue that, for any given N and N 0 such that both f(X1(N)) and f(X1(N 0)) are
smaller than f(1) we have
f(X1(N))  f(X1(N 0)) = 1  


B(N) B(N 0) :
By combining step 1 with the above remark (i.e. (N; C(N)) = (N 0; C(N 0))) we obtain
B(N) +

1   [f(1)  f(X1(N))] = (N; C(N))
= (N 0; C(N 0)) = B(N 0) + 
1  

f(1)  f(X1(N 0))

;
which, upon rearranging terms, delivers the desired result.
Step 3. We argue that, for any given N; f(X1(N)) = f(1) implies that m1(N) = 1  [f(1)  
f(X1(0))] and m2(N) = 0: That m2(N) = 0 follows from Ns period 2 incentive constraint. That
26
m1(N) =

1  [f(1)  f(X1(0))] follows from noting that
m1(N) = (N; C(N)) = (0; C(0)) = 
1   [f(1)  f(X1(0))]
and rearranging terms.
For part 1 of the lemma note that the payo¤ of any given expert E;
(E; C(E)) = 
1   [f(1)  f(X1(0))] ;
is decreasing in f(X1(0)) and therefore maximized when f(X1(0)) takes its lowest possible value
consistent with the period 2 liquidity constraint of novice N = 0; m2(0)  1f(X1(0)): From step
1 (i.e. m2(0) = 11  [f(1)  f(X1(0))]), such lowest possible value for f(X1(0)) is f(1): It follows
that (E; C(E)) = f(1) for all E:
For part 2 of the lemma, f(X1(N)) = f(1) + rB(N) follows from step 2 after setting N 0 = 0
and f(X1(0)) = f(1); and V (N; C(N)) = 1 f(1) + rB(N) follows from the fact that
V (N; C(N)) = f(X1(N)) + 
1   f(1) (N; C(N))
=

1   f(1) + rB(N):
For part 3 of the lemma, f(X1(N)) = f(1) is implied by the fact that setting f(X1(N)) < f(1)
would contradict part 2 of the lemma, and V (N; C(N)) = 11 f(1) f(1) follows from the fact that
V (N; C(N)) = 1
1   f(1) (N)
=
1
1   f(1)  f(1):
For comparison, consider a scenario in which experts do not compete against each other (namely,
pairwise deviations are ruled out), while maintaining the assumption of full knowledge transfer in
at most two training periods. In that scenario, as a corollary of proposition 2, we obtain:
1. For all N such that B(N)  1 f(1);
f(X1(N)) = f(1) and V (N; C(N)) = 
1   f(1) B(N)
2. For all N such that B(N) 2


1 f(1);
1
1 f(1)

;
f(X1(N)) = (1  )B(N) and V (N; C(N)) = 0:
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3. For all N such that B(N)  11 f(1);
f(X1(N)) = f(1) and V (N; C(N)) = 0:
It follows that competition across experts (in expert-preferred form) has two e¤ects:
First, competition accelerates the speed of knowledge transfer for every novice with an initial cash
balance in the interval

0; 11 f(1)

: Indeed, in the competitive scenario, no matter how small a
novices initial cash balance is, every dollar of additional cash is translated into r dollars of additional
output in period 1, whereas in the monopolistic scenario every dollar of additional cash is translated
into r1+r dollars of additional output in period 1 only after the novices initial cash balance exceeds
the sizeable level 1rf(1).
Second, competition increases the equilibrium payo¤ for every novice with a positive cash balance.
Indeed, in the competitive scenario, a higher initial cash balance is translated into a (weakly) higher
net equilibrium payo¤, whereas in the monopolistic scenario a higher initial cash balance is translated
into a (weakly) lower net equilibrium payo¤.
VII Applications and discussion
A Slow training and rent extraction in professional service rms
Professional service rms provide a wide range of general skills to junior consultants (our appren-
tices), usually called associates(see e.g. Mester, 19993; Richer at al., 2007). Partly, this training
may be paid through lower wages, but there are reasons to believe that the training is being slowed
down while the consultants pay their dues, that is, rents are being extracted from their work, in
exchange of the promise of more training and promotion.14 Specically:
 Management consulting rms train junior consultants as generalists, and do not allow them
to specialize in a particular type of assignment or client.15 While this is usually advertised
as leading to the development of generalist consultants, partners are usually specialists.
Inside the rms, it is often discussed that the knowledge should belong to the rm, and it
is not wanted that an associate becomes good enoughat a particular type of problem or a
particular client that he can set up shop on his own, like in our setting.
 In law rms, the training of associates also seems, anecdotally, to proceed at a glacial pace
while associates are paying their dues. Numerous blog posts and articles are dedicated
14For an alternative explanation of the partnership, as a way to commit to high quality service in a context of
imperfect observability, see Levin and Tadelis (2005).
15For example, McKinsey, in its web site, says Our goal is to give you team assignments that will
help you develop new talents and expose you to a diverse portfolio of clients, industries, and challenges.
(http://www.mckinsey.com/careers/how_youll_grow/team_based_growth accessed 29.3.2013).
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to describing this feature. For example, a former litigator wrote recently in the New York
Times, this recession may be the thing that delivers them from more 3,000-hour years of
such drudgery as changing the dates on securitization documents and shu­ ing them from one
side of the desk to the other... it often takes a forced exit to break the leash of inertia that
collars so many smart law graduates to mind-numbing work.16
As our analysis above suggests, with a large prize at the end, the expert can entice the novice to
long training periods with little knowledge added in each period, while extracting the production
generated in the process.
B Does the market deliver the optimal duration of apprenticeships?
There is a lot of policy interest in encouraging rms to o¤er apprenticeships. The G20 ministers
meeting in Guadalajara, Mexico declared themselves committed to promote, and when necessary,
strengthen quality apprenticeship systems that ensure high level of instruction and adequate remu-
neration and avoid taking advantage of lower salaries(OECD, 2012). The OECD (2012:5) argues
that Quality apprenticeships require good governance to prevent misuse as a form of cheap labour.
Is this concern legitimate?
In a word, yes. Our analysis suggests that the expert, in order to extract rents from the ap-
prentice, will articially slow down the rate of knowledge transfer. Thus the market will not deliver
apprenticeships of the optimal duration by making them too long. This is in contrast to the previous
literature, which, consistently with the Beckerian insights on general human capital, focuses on the
distortions that occur when the trainees quit too early(or threaten to do so), thus limiting the gain
for the rm doing the training, reducing their returns, and thus reducing their incentives to under-
take training to begin with. For example Malcomson et al. (2003) argue that the optimal regulation
should increase apprenticeship length, coupled with a subsidy for each completed apprenticeship.
In fact, our analysis shows that, if the expert knows the duration is more limited, he has an
incentive on his own to train faster, which is e¢ ciency enhancing. In fact, absent technologi-
cal knowledge transmission constraints, the rate of knowledge transfer increases in a rst-order-
stochastic-dominance sense as T increases.
C International Joint Ventures as Relational knowledge transfers
International joint ventures between a rst world North partner and a developing country or
Southone often involve a transfer of knowledge from the North partner in exchange for a cash
ow from the South one. Regardless of the actual legal structure of the contract, the contract is
in place as long as the parties consider it in their common interest to continue the knowledge for
16Another View: In Praise of Law Firm Layo¤sJuly 1, 2009, The New York Times, Dealbook.
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cashswap, as the legal system in the developing country is often not likely to pay much attention
to the legal niceties of the contract.
A notable example of this relational rather than legaljoint venture agreement, which eventually
grew to involve the Presidents of both France and China, was the dispute between Danone and
Wahaha that started in 2007 and was settled in 2009.
The relationship started in 1996 when Danone, a French drinks and yogurt producer, established
a joint venture with the Hangzhou Wahaha group, a Chinese maker of milk drinks for children. For
Danone, the venture was a way to prot from the growing Chinese market, while the purpose for
Wahaha was to learn Danones technology. The joint venture was initially very successful, eventually
contributing 5%-6% of the entire Danones group operating prots (FT, Lex blog, April 12, 2007).
However, by 2007 Danones contribution to the joint venture had run its course, as Wahaha could
produce all the drinks on its own. In a public and acrimonious war of words, Danone accused
Wahaha of having set up a parallel organization to sell yoghurt and drinks to its clients outside of
the joint venture, making prots as large as those of the JV itself (FT, April 12, 2007). Mr. Zong,
the Chairman of Wahaha, accused Danone of trying to take control of parts of the Chinese group
not included in the joint venture.
Danone had legally the stronger hand to play, as it owned 51% of the joint venture. However,
this power was not quite real, since as the press accounts at the time recognized, the joint venture
depends on Mr. Zongs continuing cooperation. Not only is he chairman and general manager of the
joint venture, but he is the driving force behind the entire Wahaha organization. Furthermore, in
China, employees in private enterprises often feel a stronger loyalty to the boss than the organization
itself. Winning in the courts or pushing out Mr. Zong, therefore, are not solutions to Danones
problems.(FT,12 April 2007). Workers were also on Zongs side: We formally warn Danone and
the traitors they hire, we will punish your sins. We only want Chairman Zong. Please get out of
Wahaha!(WSJ 12 June 2007).
Indeed, Danone lost all its court battles in China. In December 2007, Wahaha won a trademark
arbitration in China, when the Hangzhou Arbitration Commission, based on Wahaha hometown,
accepted Wahahas request that the trademark transfer agreement be terminated. Simultaneously,
a trade union representing the companies workers (FT December 17, 2007) said it had won an
injunction freezing assets of the joint venture in Shandong province as a result of a lawsuit accusing
Danone of bad faith. Also on December 2007, Chinas state news agency Xinhua reported that
a court in far-western Xinjiang region had dismissed a lawsuit against Wahaha by a Danone sub-
sidiary.Finally, on August 2008 (see FT, 06 Aug 2008), Danone lost the appeal on the arbitration,
when the Hagnzhou Peoples courts rejected a bid by Danone to overturn the Chinese arbitration
commissions ruling in favour of Wahaha in their battle over ownership of the Wahaha trademark.
The dispute ended on October 2009 with a cash settlement after an Stockholm arbitration court
ruling (FT 1 Oct 2009) terminating all legal proceedings and leaving all the IP with Wahaha in
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exchange for a $300m cash transfer. This settlement was considered by observer a pyrrhic victory
for Danone (FT November 10, 2009). For the FT Lex column (1 oct 2009) there were two aws
in Danones JV: rst, the trademark structure (the JV did not owned the trademark). Second, to
try to settle the dispute in arbitration in Stockholm. Such arrangements, typical of foreign joint
ventures in China, work ne for routine complaints, such as one party seeking damages from the
other for a faulty product. But as a mechanism to settle complex arguments on obligations under
Chinese intellectual property law - forget it.
This type of case is far from unique, and there is a lot of anecdotal evidence that time these
disputes have been quite common. For example, Ingersoll-Rand (IR) claimed Zhengchang Liyang
Machinery Company Ltd. (ZC) had breached the Joint Venture Agreement by manufacturing
and selling imitation processing equipment based on IRs patents (2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18449).
Again the government of China concluded that IR had defrauded ZC by falsifying the value of its
contribution to the joint venture. The disputes between IR and ZC grew so severe that ZC built
a ve-foot wall down the middle of the factory used by the joint venture to remedy the short
changingthat it felt it had been receiving from IR.
Our analysis illuminates multiple aspects of this type of cases. Like in our model, these are cases
where there e¤ectively are no legally enforceable contracts; no commitment on novices (Wahahas)
side, and knowledge is transmitted over time. Danone completely misread the situation, relying on
its legal rights rather than on what the parties could bring to the relationship. Knowing about the
lack of enforceability, Danone should have taken actions to reduce from the start the outside option
of apprentice: IPs/Trademarks.
The weak institutions in China transform the relationship between the two companies to one
which is equivalent to the one between two human beings were human capital is being transmitted.
VIII Conclusion
An extensive literature has grappled with the paradox that rms often pay for general training.
A key insight in that literature is that rms pay for that type of training because competition for
human capital is far from perfect, allowing rms to extract su¢ cient rents. Here, we provide an
alternative answer: the teacher trains the student in the expectation of future payment, while the
student pays the teacher, using the output produced by means of his acquired knowledge, due to
the expectation of subsequent training.
We show that the optimal contract takes the form of an apprenticeship in which the student
accumulates no savings and uses all his output to pay for additional knowledge until training is
complete. During training, paying the student with knowledge, rather than cash, is preferred by
both the student and teacher, as it increases total surplus. Moreover, training lasts for a nite
number of periods. The reason is that during every training period the teacher extracts all the
output produced one period before, and since output increases as knowledge increases, knowledge
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must be transferred at an increasing rate.
As we show, the teacher ine¢ ciently delays the knowledge transfer. Intuitively, since future
knowledge transfers are the only way to reward the student, the teacher must keep enough knowledge
in reserve so that the student has the incentive to return for further training. Moreover, the more
patient the players, the lower the transfer rate, the longer the training phase, and the larger the
associated deadweight losses. Indeed, when players are more patient, the expert can keep the student
around with a smaller immediate transferfuture transfers are viewed as more valuablewhich in
turn allows the expert to extract larger future transfersalso viewed as more valuable.
While the bulk of our analysis discusses a novice who wishes to acquire general knowledge and
has no cash to pay for it, we show that our core ndings are robust. Specically we show that
the fundamental contract form and the associated distortions are qualitatively unchanged if the
novice arrives with some cash up front, or if the knowledge is partially specic, so that when the
novice quits, his knowledge is less valuable than when used in association with the expert. We also
study the impact of training externalities, that is when the expert directly su¤ers, e.g. because of
competition, or benets, e.g. because of team production, from the novices knowledge acquisition.
We show that these variations a¤ect the speed of knowledge transfer, but not the core properties of
the optimal contract. Finally, we introduce competition between experts for novices with di¤erent
amounts of initial cash. We show that competition accelerates the speed of knowledge transfer, with
those novices with higher initial cash balances obtaining faster training and receiving higher rents.
Our model has a range of implications. The most general one is perhaps the prediction that the
training of juniors is articially delayed in the sense that it takes too long relative to the underlying
technological constraints. An instance of this ine¢ ciency are careers in professional services, such
as consulting and the law, in which it appears, anecdotally, that juniors spend many years paying
their dues to the partners. During those years, juniors are involved in wasteful drudgery, rather
than in maximizing their learning rate.
Beyond apprenticeships, our model has implications for knowledge transfers in international al-
liances and joint ventures. The imperfect contractibility that results from poor contractual enforce-
ment in many developing countries means that contracts between companies exhibit the same lack
of commitment characteristic of human capital. We study two specic examples of companies de-
veloping partnerships in China and argue that the speed of knowledge transfer must trade o¤, also
in those cases, the amount of output generated against the ability of the teacher, in this case the
developed-country partner, to extract rents using the promise of further training.
More generally, if patience decreases the rate of knowledge transfer, then features that are tra-
ditionally considered to a¤ect this parameter, such as a higher probability of interaction, a longer
horizon, or a more reliable partner, will lead, contrary to what might be expected, to larger ine¢ -
ciencies and slower transfer rates. Some of the empirical implications of our analysis allow a possible
falsication of the model. For example, looking at a cross section of industries, the model is falsied
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if the industries with the lower initial training see larger training rates per period.
The model is highly tractable and can be used as a building block for other models in which
human capital acquisition is relevant. In future work, we expect to study training hierarchies, where
an expert can train a number of other agents who in turn can train others. Also, in order to
emphasize the role of the students incentive constraints, we have assumed that knowledge transfers
are not subject to technological constraints, and so players could transfer all knowledge in one go
if they so desired. Future work may consider the implications of the interaction between incentive
and technological constraints (such as communication costs, varying languages, and organizational
codes) for the rate of knowledge transfer and for the growth of productivity.
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IX Appendix A
This appendix completes the proof of lemma 1. We begin with a remark.
Remark 3 Suppose C is an optimal contract such, for some t; Xt < Xsup(C) andmt < 1Bt 1(C

).
Then, there exists a contract C0 with the following features: (1) it delivers the same payo¤ as C;
(2) m0t =
1
Bt 1(C
0
); and (3) ICt+1 is slack.
Proof. Let 1Bt 1(C

)   mt =  > 0 and, without loss, set ck = 0; and therefore Vk(C

) =
t+2 kVt+2(C); for all k  t+ 2:
Now let C0 be identical to C except for the following changes: (1)m0t =mt+; (2)m0t+1 = mt+1 
1
: Note that Vk(C
0
) = Vk(C) for all k; Bk(C0) = Bk(C) for all k 6= t; and 1Bt(C
0
) = 1Bt(C)  1:
Under the new contract C0 ; Lt holds with equality, ICt is una¤ected, Lt+1 continues to hold (as
1
Bt falls by
1
 and mt+1 also falls by
1
); and ICt+1 is relaxed because
1
Bt falls.
Now suppose toward a contradiction that C is an optimal contract and yet there exists a period
k such that Xk < Xsup(C) and mk < 1Bk 1(C): Owing to the above remark we can replace C
with an optimal contract C0 with the same knowledge transfers as C such that: (i) ICk+1 is slack;
and (ii) for all t, X 0t < Xsup(C
0
) implies m0t =
1
Bt 1(C
0
): From the proof of lemma 2, C0 must have a
nite training phase and, from the proof of lemma 3, every incentive constraint during the training
phase of C0 (which includes k + 1) must bind, which contradicts the fact that C0 is optimal in the
rst place.
X Appendix B: proof of lemma 3
Proof. Let T denote the last period of the training phase. Without loss, set ct = 0; and therefore
Vt(C) = T tVT (C), for all t < T:
From step 1,
mt =
1

f(Xt 1) for all t < T; and
VT (C) = 1

BT 1  mT +
1
1   f(Xsup(C
)) =
1

f(XT 1) mT +
1
1   f(Xsup(C
)):
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Therefore, the experts payo¤ isXT 1
t=2
t 2f(Xt 1) + 
T 1mT =XT 1
t=2
t 2f(Xt 1) + 
T 1

1

f(XT 1) +
1
1   f(Xsup(C
))  VT (C)

:
where the values of Xt and ct satisfy the novices incentive constraints
1
1   f(X

t 1) +
1

f(Xt 1) =
1
(1  )f(X

t 1)  T tVT (C) for all t  T:
First, we claim that all such constraints must hold with equality. Notice that the R.H.S. is
increasing in t: Now suppose, contrary to this claim, that at least one such constraint holds with
strict inequality. Select the largest t0 < T such that the corresponding constraint holds with strict
inequality, and so f(Xt0) < f(X

t0+1). Notice that the expert could have attained a higher payo¤ by
increasing Xt0 by a small amount while holding every other X

t constant, a contradiction.
It follows that the experts payo¤ further simplies toXT 1
t=2
T 1(1  )VT (C) + T 1

(1  )VT (C) + 1
1   f(Xsup(C
))  VT (C)

= T 1

(T   1)(1  )VT (C) + 1
1   f(Xsup(C
))  VT (C)

;
where VT (C) satises two restrictions: (1) VT (C)  11 f(Xsup(C)) (which follows from the
fact that 1BT 1   mT  0); and (2) VT (C) < 1(1 )f(Xsup(C)) (which follows from the in-
centive constraint for period T holding with equality and, simultaneously, f(XT 1) being lower
than f(Xsup(C))). Notice that the experts payo¤ is linear in VT (C) and she can freely vary the
value of VT (C) (subject to the two restrictions above) by varying mT :
Second, we claim that (T   1)(1   ) < 1: Suppose not. Then, given our genericity assumption
(i.e. n(1   ) < 1 for every n = 1; 2; :::) we must have (T   1)(1   ) > 1: But in this case, the
expert could increase her payo¤ by increasing VT (C) by a small amount while still satisfying the
two restrictions above, a contradiction.
Third, and nally, given that (T   1)(1  ) < 1; the optimality of VT (C) requires this value to
be equal to 11 f(Xsup(C)) (i.e. the lowest value allowed by the restrictions above). It follows that
mT =
1
f(X

T 1), which in turn implies m

T =
1
BT 1:
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gFigure 1: Optimal duration with externalities 
(level curves):
Level curves are a function of g (the externality) and d (the 
discount factor). Lighter areas correspond to longer 
durations.
d
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Figure 2: Optimal duration with specific knowledge 
(level curves) 
Level curves are a function of l (degree of generality of 
knowledge) and d (the discount factor). Lighter areas correspond 
to longer durations.
l
d
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